Electronic academic journal platforms provide new services of text and/or data mining and linking, indispensable for e¢ cient allocation of attention among overabundant sources of scienti…c information. Fully realizing the bene…t of these services requires interconnection among the platforms. Motivated by CrossRef, a multilateral citation linking backbone, this paper performs a comparison between a multilateral interconnection regime and a bilateral one and …nds that publishers are fully interconnected in the former while they may partially break connectivity in the latter for exclusion or di¤erentiation motives. Surprisingly, if partial interconnection arises for di¤erentiation motive, exclusion of small publisher(s) occurs more often under the multilateral regime than under the bilateral one. In addition, we show that our main result is robust in the case of Internet Backbone interconnection. Finally, when publishers can interconnect both in a multilateral way and in a bilateral way, a con ‡ict between a private incentive and a social incentive may arise when large publishers prefer excluding small publishers by opting for a bilateral interconnection. In this case, a light-handed regulation imposing no discrimination among rivals would foster full interconnection.
Introduction
Electronic publishing has been bringing fundamental changes in the market for academic journals. 1 In particular, digitalization of text, data and image is transforming the system of academic communication as an interactive one based on the new techniques of text, data and image mining and linking. 2 These techniques are extremely useful for the effective dissemination of scienti…c knowledge as the volume of scienti…c information grows exponentially. For instance, in biology where large amount of data are accumulating on genes, proteins etc., it is all but impossible for a single researcher to keep pace with new information about just a handful of genes even though he or she has access to information about 30000 genes. The techniques help researchers to make e¢ cient allocation of their attention among the overabundant information sources by allowing them to extract meaning from digitized text and data and to search for the relevant information. The techniques are useful not only in data-rich hard science but also have many applications in social sciences and humanities. 3 Fully realizing the bene…t from techniques of text and data mining and linking requires interconnection (i.e. interoperability) among di¤erent platforms of scholarly publications such that seamless cross-platform search and navigation can be made. In this paper, we study publishers'incentive to interconnect their journal platforms.
Actually, a large number of publishers provide links through CrossRef, a backbone o¤ering a collaborative reference linking service that allows users to click on a citation and be taken directly to the target content. It currently has over 1,462 participating publishers and societies 4 and more than 16 million content items are registered in the 1 For instances, it has allowed publishers to practice bundling and price discrimination based on usage.
Furthermore, open access journals which provide free on-line access have been introduced as an alternative to the traditional reader (or library)-pays model of journal pricing. 2 For instance, in biology, there is a software which can recognize a two-dimensional image of a molecule and search for all the articles studying the same molecule. 3 For instance, "digitized corpus can be analyzed in ways scholars whose work is con…ned to printed volumes are not able to explore."(European Commission, 2007, p.15) 4 The Board of Directors currently comprises representatives from AAAS (Science), AIP, ACM, APA, Blackwell Publishers, Elsevier Science, IEEE, Wolters Kluwer, Nature, Sage, Springer, Taylor & Francis, Thieme, University of California Press, University of Chicago Press and Wiley.
CrossRef system. 5 In particular, it allows publishers to avoid bilateral linking agreements since a single agreement with CrossRef serves as a linking agreement with all participating publishers. Motivated by the practice of CrossRef, this paper performs a comparison between a multilateral interconnection regime à la CrossRef and a bilateral interconnection regime in terms of incentives to interconnect. We also investigate how interconnection a¤ects pro…ts and social welfare. As the main result, we …nd that all active publishers interconnect under the multilateral regime even when they are asymmetric while there can be partial interconnection under the bilateral regime even among symmetric publishers. The result suggests that a clause of no discrimination among rival companies facilitates full interconnection among all …rms.
Interconnection (or compatibility) choice among …rms in network industry has been a subject of intensive investigation. 6 The seminal papers on economics of network externalities (Farrell and Saloner 1985 , 1986 , Katz and Shapiro, 1985 study the compatibility issue. For instance, Katz and Shapiro (1985) show that a dominant …rm may choose to remain incompatible with a rival because it will su¤er a substantial decline in market share if it becomes compatible. 7 More recently, the literature on two-way access pricing among telecommunication networks, initiated by Armstrong (1998) and La¤ont-ReyTirole (1998a,b), studies how access prices a¤ect retail competition and interconnection through telecommunications networks'choice of retail tari¤s. In addition, Crémer-ReyTirole (henceforth, CRT, 2000) and La¤ont-Marcus-Rey-Tirole (2003) study interconnection among Internet Backbone providers (IBP) in a peering regime or in a regime of access pricing respectively. 8 A general …nding in the literature on interconnection without access pricing is that when networks are asymmetric, big networks might have an incentive to make the networks incompatible (or break connectivity) since complete compatibility (or interconnection) means that big and small networks become equal (Katz-Shapiro, 1985 , CRT, 2000 . Since we study interconnection without access pricing, we focus on asymmetric publishers although we analyze symmetric publishers as well. We contribute to the literature by studying a multilateral interconnection and comparing it with a bilateral one: the existing literature on interconnection typically considers two …rms and hence does not make distinction between the two modes of interconnection.
adoption of a new technology and identify ine¢ ciency in terms of both "excess momentum" and "excess inertia". 8 See Economides (2006) for a survey on the economics of the Internet Backbone market. 9 To our knowledge, Matutes-Padilla (1994) and CRT (2000) are the only papers that consider more
Regarding interconnection among electronic academic journal platforms, U.K. Competition Commission (2001) mentions big publishers' incentive not to provide links to other publishers' platforms in its report about the merger between Reed Elsevier (RE) and Harcourt: 10 "... we had received some expressions of concerns from others in the industry that RE might try to undermine its competitors by denying them links with ScienceDirect, ...(p.22)".
The recent report on the market for academic journals commissioned by European Commission, Dewatripont et al. (2006) , devotes a section to the issue of interoperability and recommends to foster interoperability by supporting research and development and by promoting wide implementation of linking technologies. To the best of our knowledge, no paper has studied interconnection among academic journal platforms in a formal model.
Interestingly, academic journal platforms di¤er from other typical platforms in network industries (such as mobile phone, Internet access, ATM cards) in their multi-homing nature. More precisely, a user must get access to both journal platforms in order to enjoy the bene…t from seamless navigation across them while in the case of mobile phone networks, for instance, it is enough to subscribe to one of them to bene…t from interconnection. There are other industries such as railroads (for instance, Eurail), ski resorts etc. that share the features of the academic journal industry in that facilitating navigation across platforms owned by di¤erent …rms generates signi…cant value to consumers. Furthermore, the anti-competitive issue related to refusal to provide links to rivals in academic journals is similar to the one in the well-known case, Aspen Skiing Company v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Company, 472 U.S. 585 (1985) , in which the former owning three among all four ski resorts in Aspen refused to market all-Aspen ticket in order to weaken the competitive position of the latter owning only one resort. than two …rms. However, none of them makes a distinction between a multilateral and a bilateral interconnections. Matutes-Padilla study compatibility choice among three ATM networks but use a very strong equilibrium concept, the Perfect Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria. As a consequence, they …nd that complete compatibility never arises even though networks are symmetric, which is in contrast to the result of full interconnection among symmetric networks obtained by CRT (2000) . In Matutes-Padilla, starting from complete compatibility, any coalition of two networks has an incentive to deviate by breaking the connectivity with the third but maintaining the connectivity between themselves. Their equilibrium concept may be appropriate to an asymmetric situation in which two incumbents face an entrant but does not allow to capture the insight from LRT that interconnection, compared to no interconnection, allows to improve a network's competitive position when networks are symmetric. 10 At the time of the merger, RE's ScienceDirect was the most developed website and o¤ered access to around 1,150 journals and Harcourt's IDEAL o¤ered access to 320 journals.
We study games of interconnection and pricing among heterogenous publishers. To model price competition among publishers, we build on our previous work, Jeon and Menicucci (2006) : assuming price discrimination based on usage, 11 we consider a situation in which (for-pro…t) publishers owning di¤erent portfolio of journals compete to sell them to a library 12 which faces a budget constraint. Since we know from Jeon and Menicucci (2006) that each publisher has an incentive to bundle its journals, we assume, without loss of generality, that all publishers practice bundling. In this model, the number of publishers which succeed in making sales with positive pro…ts increases with the size of the budget. Our analysis focuses on how interconnection a¤ects which bundles of journals are sold and at what prices. In our model, there are three publishers (the large, the middle and the small one) and each publisher competes for relative standing as in the Hotelling or circular city model since the industry pro…t is equal to the budget of the library, which is given. We assume that the value created by interconnection of two bundles of journals exhibits economies of scale and increases with the stand-alone value of each bundle. 13 This implies that full interconnection among all publishers improves the relative standing of the large publisher and worsens that of the small one.
When the budget is large enough that all publishers remain active regardless of interconnection pro…les, we …nd that each publisher chooses to interconnect with all rival publishers both in the multilateral and in the bilateral interconnection regime. This is because interconnection strictly improves one's relative standing compared to no interconnection. However, if interconnection pro…les a¤ect the small publisher's ability to remain active in the market, larger publishers may be tempted to break connectivity to exclude the small one.
We …rst consider the case in which publishers can interconnect only through a multilateral regime. This case corresponds to the case in which the government imposes a no-discrimination clause in terms of interconnection. In this case, we …nd that exclusion motive does not a¤ect incentives to interconnect and all active publishers are fully interconnected. Note …rst that since full interconnection among all publishers weakens the small publisher's relative standing, the latter is excluded more often than in the absence of interconnection. If publisher 1 (the large one), for instance, does not interconnect in order 11 For instance, Derk Haank (2001) , the CEO of Elsevier Science, says: "What we are basically doing is to say that you pay depending on how useful the publication is for you-estimated by how often you use it." See also Bolman (2002) and Key Perspectives (2002) with regard to price discrimination. 12 In section 4 we consider one library and, in section 6, we extend it to any number of heterogeneous libraries. 13 This assumption is standard in the literature: the value of interconnection increases with the size of the interconnected networks. Furthermore, in section 2, we give a microfoundation to this assumption.
to exclude publisher 3 (the small one), both publishers 2 and 3 respond by interconnecting. This weakens 1's relative standing while improving the rivals'standing. Under the bilateral interconnection, interconnection between two publishers occurs only if each of them chooses to interconnect with the other. We …nd that partial interconnections may arise for two di¤erent motives: exclusion motive and di¤erentiation motive. First, when the big and the middle ones are similar, in order to exclude the small one, the large one (or the middle one) may break connectivity with the small one while maintaining connectivity with the middle one (or the large one). In this case, the exclusion of the small one occurs more often under the bilateral interconnection regime than under the multilateral one. Second, when the big one is much larger than the middle one and the middle one is similar to the small one, surprisingly, the big one may prefer maintaining connectivity only with the small one (and hence allowing it to be active in the market) to maintaining connectivity only with the middle one (and hence excluding the small one). The …rst strategy allows the big one to improve its relative standing with respect to the middle one (i.e. to further di¤erentiate itself from the middle one) so that its pro…t is larger than its duopoly pro…t obtained with the second strategy. In this case, the exclusion of the small one occurs less often under the bilateral interconnection regime than under the multilateral one since the small one is the only one interconnected with both other publishers.
We …nd qualitatively the same result in the case of symmetric publishers. All publishers are active and fully interconnected under the multilateral interconnection regime and the same outcome is obtained under the bilateral interconnection regime as long as the budget is larger than a threshold. However, if the budget is smaller than the threshold, surprisingly, exclusion of one publisher occurs due to partial interconnection. Therefore, the multilateral interconnection regime provides stronger incentives to interconnect than the bilateral one. From social welfare point of view, the multilateral regime is (at least weakly) better than the bilateral one if publishers are symmetric. However, if they are asymmetric, the multilateral regime is preferred to the bilateral one if partial interconnection arises for exclusion motive while the ranking is reversed if partial interconnection arises for di¤erentiation motive.
Finally, we endogenize the interconnection regime by analyzing a hybrid interconnection game in which publishers are free to interconnect in any of the two regimes. We …nd that the market outcome coincides with the social optimum except when the big publisher wants to exclude the small one by opting for the bilateral interconnection. When the con ‡ict arises, our previous results suggest that a light-handed regulation forbidding discrimination among rivals would foster full interconnection and restore e¢ ciency.
As a robustness check, we compare the multilateral interconnection regime with the bilateral one in the case of interconnection among IBPs in the setting of CRT (2000) and …nd that our main insight is robust: …rms have stronger incentives to interconnect under the multilateral regime than under the bilateral one. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyzes the pricing game given any interconnection pro…le. Section 4 studies the game without interconnection, the game of multilateral interconnection, the game of bilateral interconnection, compares pro…ts and social welfare and also study the case of symmetric publishers. Section 5 considers a hybrid interconnection game and endogenizes the interconnection regime. Section 6 performs robustness checks: section 6.1 extends the multilateral interconnection game to any number of heterogenous libraries and section 6.2 compares the two modes of interconnection in the case of Internet interconnection. Section 7 provides our conclusion and discusses policy implications. All the proofs except that of proposition 7 are gathered in Appendix.
Model: Moves, information, preferences
There are three publishers and a library. Publisher i is often simply denoted by i, for i = 1; 2; 3. We consider only pro…t-maximizing publishers 14 and assume that they practice bundling 15 and price discrimination based on usage and budget. B i denotes i's bundle.
Note that since publishers practice price discrimination based on usage and budget, considering only one library does not involve loss of generality at the pricing stage. We later on (in section 6) extend the analysis of the multilateral interconnection to any number of heterogenous libraries. 16 In this section, we introduce the basic games that we analyze in most of the paper. The hybrid game in which publishers can interconnect both in a multilateral way and in a bilateral way is introduced (and analyzed) in section 5.
Games with and without interconnection
We study two games of interconnection which di¤er depending on whether the interconnection regime is multilateral or bilateral. The game of multilateral interconnection à la 14 Not-for-pro…t publishers have no strategic reasons to refuse interconnections that enhance values to subscribers of their journals. 15 We can mimic the arguments in the proof of Proposition 2(i) in Jeon and Menicucci (2006) to show that, for each publisher, bundling the journals weakly dominates the alternative of no bundling (i.e., independent sales). 16 Considering only one library is necessary for tractability in the case of the bilateral interconnection since it is complicated even with one library.
CrossRef is denoted by m and the game of bilateral interconnection is denoted by b .
We also consider as a benchmark the game without interconnection denoted by 0 .
We …rst describe m .
(Sequential Interconnection) In stage i = 1; 2; 3, publisher i decides (i) whether to be active or not and, if active, (ii) whether or not to interconnect through CrossRef.
When i is active, we let x i = 1 if he 17 has joined CrossRef and x i = 0 otherwise. The actions of publisher i are observed by the two other publishers and by the library. We use A f1; 2; 3g to denote the set of active publishers.
(Pricing) In stage four, each active publisher i simultaneously chooses a price P i > 0 for B i .
In stage …ve, the library chooses bundles to buy from the set fB i : i 2 Ag.
In this game, by joining CrossRef a publisher makes multiple interconnections, i.e. with all the other publishers who are also members of CrossRef. Conversely, if publisher i does not join CrossRef then he is not interconnected with any other publisher. We use y (y 12 ; y 13 ; y 23 ) to represent the interconnection pro…le by de…ning y 12 x 1 x 2 , y 13
x 1 x 3 and y 23 x 2 x 3 . 18 Clearly, y ij 2 f0; 1g: y ij = 1 means that the platforms of i and j are interconnected and y ij = 0 means that there is no interconnection between them.
In b , publisher i can refuse to interconnect with publisher j while being interconnected with k(6 = j). Formally, b is such that:
In stage i = 1; 2; 3, publisher i (i) decides whether to be active or not and, if active, (ii) chooses x ij 2 f0; 1g and x ik 2 f0; 1g which denote his willingness to interconnect with publisher j and with publisher k(6 = j), respectively.
The actions of i are publicly observed and A is the set of active publishers.
Stages four and …ve are like in m .
In b , the variables in y (y 12 ; y 13 ; y 23 ) are de…ned as follows: y 12 x 12 x 21 , y 13 x 13 x 31 and y 23 x 23 x 32 . In b , publishers i and j can interconnect among themselves (i.e.,
x ij = x ji = 1) and at the same time i (j) can make his own platform not interconnected 17 We use "he" to for publishers. 18 CRT (2000) uses the same technology of interconnection for the most part of their paper.
with k's one by choosing x ik = 0 (x jk = 0). In m , in contrast, in order for the platforms of i and j to be interconnected it is necessary that x i = x j = 1 and then k can interconnect to both platforms by choosing x k = 1. Another interconnection con…guration of interest that does not exist in m but can exist in b is that the platforms of 1 and 3, and of 2 and 3 are interconnected, but those of 1 and 2 are not. This occurs if (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (0; 1), (x 21 ; x 23 ) = (0; 1) and (x 31 ; x 32 ) = (1; 1), so that y = (0; 1; 1). The reason why we study the sequential game of interconnection is that the simultaneous game of bilateral interconnection has too many equilibria. 19 Considering the sequential game signi…cantly reduces the number of equilibria such that we obtain a unique outcome. in which active publishers choose prices for their bundles and then the library makes her purchases. Clearly, depends on the active publishers and on the interconnection pro…le y, but we do not emphasize this fact in the notation.
The agents'preferences
In order to determine the library's purchases in stage …ve it is necessary to specify the library's preferences. A publisher's platform provides several services, which can be regrouped into two categories: basic service (reading, printing and downloading articles) and advanced service (text and data mining and linking). Let b i represent the utility that the library obtains from basic service after buying B i and assume that
The library's utility from basic service when it purchases
The library's utility from advanced service depends both on the bundles it buys and on the interconnection pro…le among them. In case the library subscribes only to B i , its utility from advanced service is I(b i ), where I(0) = 0 and I(:) is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly convex (for instance, I(b) = b 2 with > 0); thus, the marginal surplus from advanced service increases as b i becomes larger. If the library purchases B i &B j , its utility from advanced service is I( 
In order to simplify notation, we introduce
and I (I 12 ; I 13 ; I 23 ). While U i represents the "stand-alone" utility that the library obtains from B i when y ij = y ik = 0, I ij is the increase in surplus for the library, with respect to U i + U j , from interconnection between i and j. The assumption
The library's total utility from buying one or more bundles is given by its utility from basic service plus the utility from advanced service, minus the money spent. We assume that the library has a …xed budget M > 0 which can be used only to buy journals. 24 Therefore, the publishers compete for the library's budget and we assume that they have complete information about (M; U; I).
If we assume M U , then we …nd that in 0 (the benchmark without interconnection)
there is no competition among publishers since publisher i = 1; 2; 3 can extract the full surplus from the library by charging a price equal to U i . While this fact suggests to restrict attention to M < U , we actually assume M U I 12 , which is stronger than 20 We may also add a parameter representing the quality of interconnection, but it would not a¤ect our results while adding notational complexity. 21 The value added from interconnection would be zero if I(:) were linear (i.e., if I(b) = b) and would be negative if I(:) were strictly concave. Therefore, we view convexity of I(:) as a reasonable assumption. 22 By the strictly convexity of I(:), this utility increases as the number of interconnected platforms increases. 23 For instance, when I(b) = b 2 with > 0, we have:
24 In Jeon and Menicucci (2006) we allow the library to use the budget to buy journals and books and assume that the library obtains utility v(m) from spending m M to purchase books, with v increasing and concave. Hence, we can see our current setting as one in which v(m) = m. Since interconnection complicates the analysis, we make this simpli…cation to obtain closed form formulas for equilibrium prices.
M < U , in order to simplify the exposition. 25 We show later on that this implies that the equilibrium prices always add up to M , which means that the library always exhausts its budget on buying journals. When we study m or b , we adopt the following simplifying assumption:
A1: I(:) is not too convex such that the following inequalities hold:
U 1 U 2 + I 23 and U 2 U 3 + I 13 imply that interconnection does not alter the ranking of pro…ts among the publishers with respect to the benchmark of no interconnection. This is a simplifying assumption that allows us to focus on publisher 3's decision to be active or not when we study how interconnection a¤ects the set of active publishers. U 3 I 12 implies that the value from interconnection is small relative to the value from the original bundle of journals. This simpli…es the statements of our results but does not a¤ect the results themselves. 26 For robustness check, we also consider the symmetric cases (i.e.
Since we would like to study publishers'incentives to interconnect and how interconnection a¤ects which publishers succeed in selling their bundles and at what prices, we assume that the …xed cost of producing the …rst electronic copy of each journal has already been incurred and that the marginal cost of distributing each electronic journal through Internet is zero. Furthermore, we assume that interconnection is costless in order to focus on strategic interconnection incentives related to journal pricing. 27 Therefore, the pro…t of an active publisher i is equal to P i if the library purchases B i ; i's pro…t is 0 otherwise.
In the next sections we use the concept of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) to determine the publishers'behavior in . To …nd SPNE, from backward induction, we need to …nd the Nash equilibria (NE henceforth) of under various possible scenarios regarding decisions to be active and to interconnect. However, when all three publishers are active, in some cases has in…nitely many NE in which the prices of the bundles the library buys depend on the prices of bundles the library does not buy. 28 In order to eliminate this indeterminacy, we adopt the following tie-breaking rule as in Jeon and 25 Our results below hold also when U I 12 < M < U , but then we need to deal with a multiplicity of equilibria (o¤ the equilibrium path), which requires to consider a large number of cases depending on the parameter values. 26 For instance, if I 12 > 2U 2 + U 3 , then M I 12 is smaller than U 1 U 2 and only 1 is active. This case is not interesting since interconnection plays no role. 27 We remark, however, that our results would qualitatively hold if we introduce a small interconnection fee c > 0. 28 For instance, suppose that U 1 = 10, U 2 = 2, U 3 = 1 and M = 9. Then, for any 2 [0; 3 ], there exists a SPNE of 0 in which P 1 = 9 , P 2 = P 3 = and the library buys B 1 &B 2 .
Menicucci (2006).
T1: In each game 2 f m ; b ; 0 g, any publisher i prefers being non-active to being active but unable to make a strictly positive pro…t.
T1 can be justi…ed if a publisher would incur a very small but positive cost of contracting the library. Therefore, in a SPNE, publisher i is active if and only if in stage …ve the library purchases B i at some price
In what follows, we let P i denote the equilibrium price for B i and, likewise, (A ;
, an intuitive result holds, which can be stated as follows: in any SPNE, publisher 1 is active; if publisher 3 is active, then publisher 2 is active as well. In other words, the following lemma applies.
or A = f1; 2; 3g:
3 The pricing game
In this section, we describe the NE of as a function of A and y, which is useful to determine the SPNE of 2 f m ; b ; 0 g. The next lemma considers the cases of A = f1; 2; 3g and A = f1; 2g, provides the condition on M under which all active publishers realize positive pro…ts and characterizes the equilibrium prices.
Lemma 2 (pricing game) (i) Under A1, for A = f1; 2; 3g and for given y, there exists a NE of in which the library buys B 1 &B 2 &B 3 and all publishers realize strictly positive pro…ts if and only if M > M (y) U 3U 3 + 2I 12 y 12 I 13 y 13 I 23 y 23 . Furthermore, for any M between M (y) and U I 12 , the NE is unique and prices are given by:
where I I 12 y 12 + I 13 y 13 + I 23 y 23 : Therefore, P 1 (y) + P 2 (y) + P 3 (y) = M:
(ii) For A = f1; 2g and for any y 12 , there exists a NE of in which the library buys B 1 &B 2 and both publishers realize strictly positive pro…ts if and only if M > U 1 U 2 .
Furthermore, for any M between U 1 U 2 and U 1 + U 2 , the NE is unique and prices are given by
Lemma 2 has some results that help us to understand the number of active publishers in 2 f m ; b ; 0 g. First, independently of y, if M U 1 U 2 then there is no NE of in which both publishers 1 and 2 (or all the three publishers) make a strictly positive pro…t. This implies that, when M U 1 U 2 , only 1 will be active in SPNE and P 1 = M . The reason is that if publisher 2 (for instance) is active as well, he makes no pro…t because the library's payo¤ from buying only B 1 is U 1 M , which is higher than the payo¤ U 2 P 2 obtained by purchasing B 2 , for any P 2 > 0. When M > U 1 U 2 , this argument does not apply because U 2 P 2 > U 1 M for P 2 close to 0; thus A will include at least f1; 2g. Second, when M > U 1 U 2 , whether 3 also will be active or not depends on whether M is larger or smaller than M (y). Thus, while the interconnection pro…le y does not a¤ect the set of parameter values for which only 1 is active, it determines the values of M for which all publishers are active: it is easy to see that M (y) is increasing (decreasing) with respect to y 12 (with respect to y 13 and y 23 ). We now brie ‡y explain how M (y) is determined. Clearly, 3 is active if and only if he is able to sell B 3 at a positive price when A = f1; 2; 3g. Hence, we need to know how the equilibrium prices are determined. (P 1 ; P 2 ; P 3 ) should be such that the library does not purchase B i anymore if publisher i increases P i above P i . It turns out that this condition is satis…ed for each i if and only if the library is indi¤erent between buying B i &B j and buying B i &B k , for any i; j; k; this is equivalent to the following equalities
(1)
Furthermore, the assumption M < U I 12 implies P 1 + P 2 + P 3 = M and using this equality 29 and (1)- (2) we …nd (P 1 ; P 2 ; P 3 ) = ( P 1 (y); P 2 (y); P 3 (y)) as in Lemma 2(i). From A1, we have P 1 (y) > P 2 (y) > P 3 (y) for any interconnection pro…le y and P 3 (y) > 0 if and only if M > M (y). P i (y) is increasing in y ij and y ik and decreasing in y jk . The reason is that library's payo¤ from buying B i &B j (for instance) is higher when y ij = 1 than when y ij = 0, and (1)- (2) imply that P i needs to increase in order to make the library remain indi¤erent between B i &B j and B j &B k .
In the intermediate case of U 1 U 2 < M M (y), the active publishers are 1 and 2 and prices are determined by a principle similar to the one explained above: given (P 1 ; P 2 ), publisher i (i = 1; 2) has no incentive to increase P i above P i if and only if the library is indi¤erent between purchasing only B 1 and purchasing only B 2 :
This condition and P 1 + P 2 = M yield (P 1 ;P 2 ). As (3) shows, the interconnection pro…le has no impact on the equilibrium prices when only two publishers are active.
The Interconnection games
In this section we analyze 0 , m and b .
4.1 Benchmark: The game without interconnection Proposition 1 (without interconnection) In 0 there exists a unique SPNE and the equilibrium active publishers and prices are given by:
, then A = f1; 2g and P i =P i for i = 1; 2; (iii) if M (0; 0; 0) < M U I 12 , then A = f1; 2; 3g and P i = P i (0; 0; 0) for i = 1; 2; 3.
When there is no interconnection, Proposition 1 establishes that the library buys B 1 &B 2 &B 3 if and only if M is larger than M (0; 0; 0) = U 3U 3 ; otherwise some publisher is excluded from the market. We have already explained that when M U 1 U 2 , only 1 is active and P 1 = M because if 2 (or 3) is active as well, the library prefers to buy B 1 at price M rather than B 2 (or B 3 ) at any positive price. When M > U 1 U 2 , instead, f1; 2g A and also 3 is active if and only if a NE of exists in which the library buys B 1 &B 2 &B 3 . By lemma 2(i), such a NE exists if and only if M > M (0; 0; 0), and it is actually the unique NE of ; thus 3 is active if M > M (0; 0; 0).
The multilateral interconnection game m
Now we examine the multilateral interconnection game m in which publishers can interconnect only through CrossRef. We start by describing each publisher's incentive to interconnect in equilibrium. Since this incentive depends on the value of M , it is useful to notice that the following inequalities hold
The inequalities follow from the fact that M (y) is increasing in y 12 and decreasing in (y 13 ; y 23 ). This lemma establishes that in any SPNE of m , for each active publisher and for any M , interconnection is a best response and sometimes the unique best response. In particular, for M > M (0; 0; 1), publisher 1 strictly prefers interconnection and x 1 = 1 induces 2 and 3 (if active) to strictly prefer interconnection. In order to provide the intuition about this result, we remind that in our model each publisher competes for relative standing since the industry pro…t is equal to M and is constant. Consider …rst the case in which M > M (1; 0; 0), which means that the budget is large enough that even the interconnection pro…le the least favorable for 3 allows him to sell B 3 at a strictly positive price. According to lemma 3, all publishers interconnect in this case and the reason is that when at least one rival publisher is interconnected, x i = 1 increases the price P i (y) of B i because it increases the value of B i &B j and/or of B i &B k (see (1)- (2) and the discussion at the end of section 3). In other words, compared to x i = 0, x i = 1 strictly improves the relative standing of B i and thereby increases i's payo¤. This explains why 3 will play x 3 = 1 if max fx 1 ; x 2 g = 1; 1 and 2 anticipate this choice and both choose to interconnect in stages one and two. This intuition holds regardless of whether the mode of interconnection is multilateral or bilateral.
Consider now M < M (1; 0; 0). Then, whether 3 is active or not depends on the interconnection pro…le. Hence, exclusion motive may modify publisher 1's (or 2's) incentive to interconnect. Obviously, 3's interconnection increases his chance to be active because it lowers M , and this is why 3 always chooses x 3 = 1 if he is active. If 1 is interconnected (i.e. x 1 = 1), 2 always prefers x 2 = 1 because 2's relative standing is the weakest when only
From Lemma 3, we can …nd the equilibrium interconnection decisions and the resulting set of active publishers and prices. 
Therefore, the exclusion of publisher 3 is more likely in m than in 0 :
(iii) if M (1; 1; 1) < M U I 12 , then A = f1; 2; 3g, x i = 1 and P i = P i (1; 1; 1) for i = 1; 2; 3.
When M U 1 U 2 (even though interconnection is possible) the argument presented in the previous section on the pricing game establishes that only 1 is active and P 1 = M . Second, for M > U 1 U 2 we …nd that all active publishers join CrossRef and therefore 3 is active if and only if M > M (1; 1; 1). Since M (1; 1; 1) > M (0; 0; 0), this implies that CrossRef's existence makes the exclusion of the smallest publisher, publisher 3, more likely than in the absence of interconnection. This fact bene…ts both 1 and 2 sinceP i , i's pro…t when A = f1; 2g, is larger than P i (0; 0; 0), i's pro…t in 0 when all three are active, for any M > M (0; 0; 0) and for i = 1; 2. Publisher 3 is excluded more often in m than in 0 since full interconnection increases the value of B 1 &B 2 more than the values of B 1 &B 3 and B 2 &B 3 from I 12 > I 13 > I 23 and thereby worsens 3's relative position. 30 For the sake of completeness we remark that if U 1 U 2 < M M (0; 0; 1) (respectively, if U 1 U 2 < M M (0; 1; 0)), there also exists SPNE with A = f1; 2g, x 1 = 0, x 2 = 1 (respectively, x 1 = 1, x 2 = 0 i). However, in all of these equilibria, 3 is not active and 1 and 2 charge the duopoly prices (P 1 ;P 2 ); the outcome in terms of the active publishers and their pro…ts is the same as in the Proposition. We conclude this section by examining the case in which all publishers simultaneously choose whether to be active or not, and (if active) whether to join CrossRef or not; in short, we merge stages one, two and three into a single stage and denote with ms the resulting game. In this setting, it is clear that if only one active publisher interconnects, interconnection has no e¤ect and the outcome, in terms of active publishers and prices, is identical to the one without interconnection. Therefore, there always exists a SPNE of ms in which no publisher interconnects since each publisher expects that no rival will interconnect; the outcome of this SPNE is identical to that of the SPNE of 0 (proposition 1). As a consequence, in proposition 3 we neglect this trivial equilibrium and …nd the same outcome that is described by Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 (multilateral simultaneous interconnection) Under A1, in any SPNE of ms in which at least one active publisher interconnects, the active publishers and prices are determined as follows:
3g, x i = 1 and P i = P i (1; 1; 1) for i = 1; 2; 3.
31 If U 1 U 2 < M M (0; 0; 1) (i.e., M is small enough that 3 is out if y = (0; 0; 1)), there also exists an SPNE with A = f1; 2g, x 1 = 0, x 2 = 1 and prices (P 1 ;P 2 ). Similarly, If U 1 U 2 < M M (0; 1; 0) (i.e., M is small enough that 3 is out if y = (0; 1; 0)), there also exists an SPNE with A = f1; 2g x 1 = 1, x 2 = 0, and prices (P 1 ;P 2 ). From the arguments made in sections 4.1-4.2, the following results are straightforward; (a) for M U 1 U 2 , only 1 is active and P 1 = M ; (b) when U 1 U 2 < M M (0; 1; 1) (i.e. even the interconnection pro…le the most favorable for 3 does not allow 3 to sell B 3 ), only 1 and 2 are active and (P 1 ; P 2 ) = (P 1 ;P 2 ); (c) when M (1; 0; 0) < M U I 12 (even the interconnection pro…le the least favorable for 3 allows it to sell its bundle), all publishers are active, fully interconnected and P i = P i (1; 1; 1) for i = 1; 2; 3; (d) publisher 3 always chooses to interconnect with both publishers.
The bilateral interconnection game
However, it is quite long to describe, for all possible values of M and I, 2's best response for each (x 12 ; x 13 ) and 1's choice. Therefore, in the following lemma, we describe only some interconnection choices that are relevant to understand the equilibrium choices. 32 We can study the other cases since the analysis of the bilateral interconnection game basically follows from the analysis of the pricing game (presented in lemma 2) and lemma 2 is proved for general parameter values. We do not present these cases since it will take too much space without adding interesting insight. 33 In m , the pro…les y = (1; 1; 0), y = (1; 0; 1) and y = (0; 1; 1) cannot arise because, for instance, First, when M (0; 1; 1) < M M (0; 1; 0), 3 can be active only if 3 is interconnected with both 1 and 2 while 1 and 2 are not interconnected. Hence, any publisher j (with j=1,2) can unilaterally exclude 3 by choosing x j3 = 0 and the exclusion occurs since 2's duopoly pro…t is larger than P 2 (0; 1; 1).
Second, when M (0; 1; 0) < M M (1; 1; 0), as long as 1 and 2 are interconnected, 2 can exclude 3 by choosing x 23 = 0. Hence, if 1 chooses (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (1; 1), 2 excludes 3 since its duopoly pro…t is larger than the pro…t it obtains by letting 3 be active. In contrast, if 1 chooses (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (0; 1) and hence breaks connectivity with 2, 2 cannot exclude 3 even if it chooses x 23 = 0. Therefore, in this case, 2 chooses x 23 = 1 and 3 is active and fully interconnected with 1 and 2. Finally, whether 1 will let 3 be active or not depends on whetherP 1 < P 1 (0; 1; 1) or not. We …nd thatP 1 P 1 (0; 1; 1) for all M between M (0; 1; 0) and M (1; 1; 0) (resp.P 1 < P 1 (0; 1; 1)) if and only if 4I 23 3I 13 (resp. 3I 13 > 2I 12 + 4I 23 ).
Third, consider M (1; 1; 0) < M M (1; 0; 1). In this case, if 1 chooses (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (1; 1), 2 cannot exclude 3 (since M > M (1; 1; 0)) and hence all publishers are active and fully interconnected. If 1 wants to exclude 3, it should choose (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (1; 0). Then 2 can exclude 3 by choosing x 21 = 1 or can let 3 be active by choosing x 21 = 0: in the latter case, 2 will choose x 23 = 1. Obviously, whether 2 will exclude 3 or not depends on whetherP 2 > P 2 (0; 1; 1) or not. The inequalityP 2 P 2 (0; 1; 1) holds for all M between M (1; 1; 0) and M (1; 0; 1) (resp.P 2 P 2 (0; 1; 1)) if and only if 2I 12 I 13 + 2I 23 (resp. 3I 23 2I 12 ). Finally, whenP 2 P 2 (0; 1; 1), 1 indeed chooses (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (1; 0) to let 2 exclude 3 ifP 1 P 1 (1; 1; 1);P 1 P 1 (1; 1; 1) holds for all M between M (1; 1; 0) and M (1; 0; 1) if and only if 4I 23 3I 13 .
Last, consider M (1; 0; 1) < M M (1; 0; 0). In this case, in order to exclude 3, 1 and 2 should cooperate by choosing x 13 = x 23 = 0. Obviously, excluding 3 maximizes joint pro…ts of 1 and 2. However, there is a coordination failure. If 1 chooses (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (1; 0), then 2 chooses (x 21 ; x 23 ) = (1; 1) and let 3 be active sinceP 2 < P 2 (1; 0; 1). Therefore, 1 chooses (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (1; 1) and all three are active and fully interconnected. (ii) if U 1 U 2 < M M (0; 1; 0), then A = f1; 2g, (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (x 21 ; x 23 ) = (1; 0) and (P 1 ; P 2 ) = (P 1 ;P 2 ); (iii) if M (0; 1; 0) < M M (1; 1; 0), then a. When 4I 23 3I 13 , A = f1; 2g, (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (1; 1), (x 21 ; x 23 ) = (1; 0) and (P 1 ; P 2 ) = (P 1 ;P 2 ).
b. When 3I 13 > 2I 12 + 4I 23 , A = f1; 2; 3g, (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (x 21 ; x 23 ) = (0; 1), (x 31 ; x 32 ) = (1; 1) and P i = P i (0; 1; 1) for i = 1; 2; 3.
(iv) if M (1; 1; 0) < M M (1; 0; 1), then a. When 4I 23 3I 13 and 2I 12 I 13 + 2I 23 , A = f1; 2g, (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (x 21 ; x 23 ) = (1; 0) and (P 1 ; P 2 ) = (P 1 ;P 2 ).
b. When 3I 23 2I 12 , A = f1; 2; 3g, (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (x 21 ; x 23 ) = (x 31 ; x 32 ) = (1; 1) and P i = P i (1; 1; 1) for i = 1; 2; 3. (v) if M (1; 0; 1) < M < U I 12 , then A = f1; 2; 3g, (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (x 21 ; x 23 ) = (x 31 ; x 32 ) = (1; 1) and P i = P i (1; 1; 1) for i = 1; 2; 3.
Proposition 4 shows that the exclusion of 3 can occur more often or less often under the bilateral interconnection than under the multilateral one. We remind that under the multilateral interconnection, the exclusion occurs if M M (1; 1; 1) where M (1; 1; 1) 2 ( M (0; 1; 0); M (1; 1; 0)).
First, if either 1 or 2 decides to break connectivity with 3 for exclusion motive, exclusion occurs more often under the bilateral interconnection than under the multilateral one. For instance, according to Proposition 4 (iii)a, this happens if 4I 23 3I 13 . Since I 13 > I 23 always holds, 4I 23 3I 13 implies that 1 is not much bigger than 2. For M 2 ( M (0; 1; 0); M (1; 1; 0)), if asymmetry between 1 and 2 is small, 1 and 2 can maintain duopoly: more precisely, by choosing full interconnection (i.e. (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (1; 1)), 1 incentivizes 2 to exclude 3 through partial interconnection (i.e. (x 21 ; x 23 ) = (1; 0)). Proposition 4 (iv)a shows that for M 2 ( M (1; 1; 0); M (1; 0; 1)), the bilateral interconnection regime can induce exclusion of 3 while exclusion never occurs under the multilateral interconnection: in this case, 1 actively excludes 3 through partial interconnection (i.e. (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (1; 0)).
Second, if publisher 1 breaks connectivity with 2 but maintains connectivity with 3 for di¤erentiation motive, exclusion occurs less often under the bilateral interconnection than under the multilateral one. More precisely, according to proposition 4 (iii)b, this happens for M 2 ( M (0; 1; 0); M (1; 1; 0)), if 3I 13 > 2I 12 + 4I 23 . 3I 13 > 2I 12 + 4I 23 means that 2 and 3 are similar (so that I 13 is only slightly smaller than I 12 ) but 1 is much larger than 2 (so that I 13 is much larger than I 23 ). In this case, 1 has an incentive to break connectivity with 2 and let 3 be active by interconnecting with 3: then, 2 responds by interconnecting with 3 and therefore 3 becomes fully interconnected with 1 and 2. Since I 13 is much larger than I 23 because of the large asymmetry between 1 and 2, this strategy improves 1's relative standing such that its pro…t P 1 (0; 1; 1) is larger than its duopoly pro…tP 1 . In short, when 1 is much larger than 2, it pays for 1 to di¤erentiate itself from 2 by breaking connectivity with 2 but maintaining it with 3. Finally, the above arguments show that publishers have less incentive to interconnect under the bilateral interconnection than under the multilateral one: the bilateral interconnection induces publishers to employ partial interconnection for exclusion motive or for di¤erentiation motive. 
Social welfare
In our setting the sum of the publishers' pro…ts is always equal to M ; hence, social welfare coincides with the library's payo¤. It follows from A1 that social welfare (and the library's payo¤) increases with the number of bundles the library is able to buy regardless of y; social welfare also increases as more platforms are interconnected for a given set of subscribed bundles. We below give detailed comparisons among 0 , m , b partly because we use it in section 5. 
Symmetric publishers
We have assumed until now that A1 holds, which means that publishers are su¢ ciently asymmetric. In the opposite case of symmetric publishers we obtain the following result:
Proposition 5 (symmetric publishers) Suppose that publishers are symmetric in the sense that b 1 = b 2 = b 3 = b s (and thus U 1 = U 2 = U 3 = U s > I 12 = I 13 = I 23 = I s ).
(i) For each 2 f 0 ; m g there exists a unique SPNE and it is such that A = f1; 2; 3g,
a. For M I s , there are two equilibrium outcomes: either A = f1; 2g and (P 1 ; P 2 ) = (M=2; M=2) or A = f1; 3g and (P 1 ; P 3 ) = (M=2; M=2).
b. For M 2 [I s ; U I s ), there is a unique SPNE and it is such that A = f1; 2; 3g, P i = M=3, x ij = 1 for i; j = 1; 2; 3 with i 6 = j. and strictly larger than in 0 .
Proposition 5 shows that symmetric publishers have incentives to fully interconnect under the multilateral interconnection regime regardless of the size of the budget and under the bilateral interconnection regime for M > I s . What is rather surprising is that under the bilateral regime, when M I s , even symmetric publishers have incentives to partially break connectivity to exclude a publisher: in all equilibria either 2 or 3 is excluded. For instance, the following is an equilibrium: 1 is active and chooses x 12 = x 13 = 1 and 2 is active and chooses x 21 = 1 and x 23 = 0. In this situation, 3 decides not to be active since he cannot realize any positive pro…t: in particular, if 3 becomes active and chooses x 31 = 1, a sort of Bertrand competition arises between 2 and 3 at the pricing stage such that (P 1 ; P 2 ; P 3 ) = (M; 0; 0) is the unique equilibrium.
Endogenizing interconnection regime
In the previous sections, we analyzed the outcome of a given (either multilateral or bilateral) regime of interconnection. In this section, we study which regime between the two emerges endogenously when publishers are free to interconnect in either regime. In the absence of regulation imposing a clause of no discrimination among rivals in terms of interconnection, the mere existence of a multilateral regime such as CrossRef does not eliminate the possibility for publishers to engage in bilateral interconnection.
To address the above question, we examine the following hybrid game of sequential interconnection h : 34 at stage i = 1; 2; 3, …rm i decides whether to interconnect or not through CrossRef -by selecting x i 2 f0; 1g -and also chooses x ik 2 f0; 1g, x ij 2 f0; 1g, which indicate his willingness to interconnect bilaterally with …rm k and …rm j. Firms i and j are interconnected if and only if both of them join CrossRef (x i = x j = 1) or they 34 The superscript "h" means "hybrid". The result in Lemma 5(i) is intuitive: if x 1 = 0, then at most 2 and 3 can be interconnected through CrossRef (this occurs if x 2 = x 3 = 1). But the bilateral interconnection between 2 and 3 can be equivalently achieved with x 23 = x 32 = 1 and …rm 2 (3) has an incentive to choose x 23 = 1 (x 32 = 1) as long as it has an incentive to choose x 2 = 1 (x 3 = 1). If x 1 = 1, 3 plays x 3 = 1 by the same logic of lemma 3(i) 35 and hence the value of x 13 is irrelevant. There remain hence only the following two alternatives for …rm 1 to consider: x 1 = 1, x 12 = 0, and x 1 = 1, x 12 = 1. We prove that x 1 = 1, x 12 = 0 is equivalent to x 1 = 1 in m , and therefore the equilibrium outcome of m arises; x 1 = 1,
Because of Lemma 5, we can view h as a game which di¤ers from b in that 1 has an additional strategy, which allows him to implement the same outcome as in Proposition 6 and Corollary 3 suggest that the market outcome can sometimes coincide with that of the multilateral interconnection. Given that full interconnection improves relative standing of big publishers because of economies of scale in the value generated by interconnection, big publishers may have an incentive to endorse a multilateral interconnection regime and this can explain the success of CrossRef.
Finally, comparing corollary 2 (social welfare) and corollary 3 (1's pro…t) leads to:
Corollary 4 In the hybrid interconnection game h , the con ‡ict between the market outcome and social welfare arises only when 4I 23 3I 13 in the following case: either M 2 M ; M (1; 1; 0) i or M 2 M (1; 1; 0); M (1; 0; 1) and 2I 12 I 13 + 2I 23 . In this case, the outcome of h is equivalent to that of b and involves exclusion of 3 while in m all publishers are active and therefore social welfare is higher in m than in b .
Note …rst that 1's duopoly pro…t increases faster than 1's triopoly pro…t as M increases. This suggests that 1's incentive to exclude 3 increase with M and therefore the con ‡ict between 1's pro…t and social welfare is more likely as M increases. However, if M is large enough (i.e. larger than M (1; 0; 1)), all publishers are active both in m and b . Therefore, the con ‡ict can arise only for an intermediate level of M i.e. M 2 M ; M (1; 0; 1) i . Then, the outcome of the hybrid game can involve exclusion of 3 since either 1 and/or 2 break(s) connectivity with 3. In this case, our results suggest that a light-handed regulation banning discrimination among rivals in terms of interconnection would foster full interconnection and induce all publishers to be active.
Robustness
To show that our main result is robust, in this section we …rst show that, under the multilateral interconnection regime, all publishers interconnect for any number of heterogenous libraries and regardless of whether we consider a sequential or a simultaneous game. Second, we perform comparison between the multilateral interconnection regime and the bilateral one in the Internet interconnection model of CRT (2000).
Multilateral interconnection and heterogenous libraries
There are m( 1) number of heterogenous libraries: libraries di¤er in terms of the budget and the value that they obtain from the bundle of publisher i. Let U 
for h = 1; :::; m.
Each publisher practices price discrimination based on usage and budget: let P h i represent the price of the bundle that publisher i charges to library h. We consider the following sequential game of multilateral interconnection and pricing.
(Sequential Interconnection ) In stage i = 1; 2; 3, publisher i (i) decides whether to be active or not; (ii) if he is active, i decides whether or not to interconnect through CrossRef.
(Pricing) In stage four, all active publishers simultaneously decide whether to be active or not in the market for library h, for h = 1; :::; m. In stage …ve, each publisher i, if active in market h, simultaneously chooses a price P In stage six, each library h chooses bundles to buy.
Note that publishers'interconnection decisions a¤ect all libraries in the same way. As before, we adopt the tie-breaking rule that if publisher i expects to make zero pro…t in the market for library h, then he prefers not to be active in that market in stage four: if publisher i expects to realize a total pro…t equal to zero, he prefers not to be active in stage i = 1; 2; 3. Then we get the following corollary from the analysis of section 4.2:
Corollary 5 Suppose there are m(> 1) number of libraries that are heterogenous in terms of budgets and preferences, but such that the ranking of bundles is the same for each library, and A1'is satis…ed. Then, in the sequential game of multilateral interconnection we have:
for at least one h, then a unique SPNE exists and it is such that (a) all publishers which are active in at least one market interconnect; (b) for h = 1; :::; m, the set of active publishers and prices in the market for library h are determined as speci…ed by Proposition 2, as a function of U h ; I h ; M h .
(ii) If M h M h (0; 0; 1) for h = 1; :::; m, then there exists di¤erent SPNE but in all of them we have that, for h = 1; :::; m, A h = f1; 2g and (P
This corollary says that in the setting of multilateral interconnection it is not restrictive to limit the analysis to the case of a single library, as the game with many heterogenous libraries replicates the outcomes of the various single-library games. The reason for this result is that in the game with multiple libraries, the markets for di¤erent libraries are linked one to another only by the …rms' interconnection decisions. However, we know from section 4 that if M h > M h (0; 0; 1), then all active …rms have a strict incentive to interconnect if they consider only the market for library h. But then they will de…nitely interconnect because choosing x i = 1 never hurts …rm i in any other market (see Lemma 3) . We now consider the simultaneous game of multilateral interconnection in which stages one, two, and three are merged into a single stage, like in the game that is considered at the end of subsection 4.2. Thus, all publishers decide at the same time whether to be active or not and, if active, whether to interconnect or not. 38 Consistently with the …ndings of subsection 4.2, we obtain the same result we have derived in Corollary 5.
Corollary 6 Suppose there are m(> 1) number of libraries that are heterogenous in terms of budgets and preferences, but such that the ranking of bundles is the same for each library, and A1'is satis…ed. Then, in any SPNE of the simultaneous game of multilateral interconnection in which at least one publisher interconnects, the set of active publishers and prices are uniquely determined as speci…ed by Proposition 2, as a function of U h ; I h ; M h .
Application to Internet Interconnection
In order to check the robustness of our main result that …rms have stronger incentives to interconnect under a multilateral interconnection regime than under a bilateral one, we perform comparison between the two regimes in the Internet interconnection model of CRT (2004). They consider a Cournot setting as in Katz-Shapiro (1985) and study interconnection with peering among Internet Backbone Companies (IBP) in a bilateral interconnection regime. An important di¤erence between their model and our model is that in their model, a customer needs to subscribe only to one of the interconnected …rms in order to get bene…t from the interconnection while in our model, the library needs to subscribe to each interconnected journal platform in order to get bene…t from the interconnection. Another di¤erence is that in our model the industry pro…t is constant (equal to the library's budget) while in their model, an increase in IBPs'network sizes in terms of installed base expands the market (i.e. increases the number of new customers) and hence increases the industry pro…t. More precisely, in section VI, CRT consider an interconnection game in which each IBP i simultaneously chooses a binary interconnection decision with respect to each rival and the cost of interconnection is zero as in our model. They study the game when there are three IBPs: a big IBP having a half of the total installed base and two IBPs sharing the remaining installed base equally. They …nd in proposition 6 that under certain parameter conditions, the large IBP interconnects with only one of the two small ones in order to prevent the small one without interconnection from attracting any new customer. This is similar to what happens in our proposition 4 in which publisher 1 interconnects only with 2 or 3 for exclusion or di¤erentiation motive. However, since the small …rms are symmetric in their framework, they are not able to distinguish the two motives.
We now study what happens in their Internet interconnection model if we consider the multilateral interconnection regime. Proof. First, it is easy to see that the small IBPs will always interconnect since this improves their competitive positions: in fact, CRT …nd that they will maintain connectivity even under the bilateral interconnection regime (see their proposition 5). Suppose now that IBP 1 interconnects. Then, all IBPs are fully interconnected and hence they become completely symmetric (each IBP's network size in terms of installed base becomes ). Suppose now that IBP1 does not interconnect. In this case, after the interconnection game, each …rm's network size in terms of installed base is given by ( 1 ;
1 ; 1 ): in particular when 1 = =2, all …rms have the same network size equal to =2. Therefore, when 1 = =2, because of the market expansion e¤ect, IBP1 strictly prefers interconnection to no interconnection. By continuity, there must be a 1 (> =2) such that all IBPs fully interconnect for any 1 1 . Proposition 7 shows that as long as the dominant IBP's share in the installed base is smaller than or close to a half, all IBPs fully interconnect under the multilateral interconnection regime. Therefore, our main result that …rms have stronger incentives to interconnect under the multilateral interconnection regime than under the bilateral one is robust.
Conclusion and policy implications
Interconnection among platforms (or compatibility among networks) is an important issue that has been studied intensively. We contribute to the literature by comparing a multilateral interconnection regime with a bilateral one. We …nd that publishers have an incentive to fully interconnect under the multilateral interconnection regime while partial interconnection may arise under the bilateral interconnection regime for exclusion or for di¤erentiation motives. We also …nd that the main result is robust in the case of interconnection among Internet Backbone Companies.
A general lesson from our paper is that allowing …rms to have …ner instruments to discriminate interconnection results in less interconnection than banning the discrimination. In fact, Jeon-La¤ont-Tirole (2004) …nd a similar lesson in a di¤erent context: allowing telecommunication networks to discriminate between on-net calls and o¤-net calls can induce networks to break connectivity while without such discrimination, networks remain interconnected. In addition, both Jeon-La¤ont-Tirole and our paper show that even symmetric …rms may break connectivity when discrimination is allowed.
We show that when publishers can freely interconnect both in a multilateral way and in a bilateral way, large publishers may voluntarily endorse a multilateral interconnection regime since full interconnection among all publishers strengthens large publishers' rel-ative standing. This might explain large commercial publishers support for CrossRef. 39 However, we also …nd that there can be a con ‡ict between the market outcome and social welfare since large publishers can have an incentive to opt for bilateral interconnection in order to exclude small publishers. Then, our results suggest that a light-handed regulatory intervention banning discrimination among rivals will foster full interconnection. For instance, in the case of interconnection among internet backbone companies, the clause of no discrimination among rivals supplemented with a merger control forbidding the creation of a dominant …rm would induce full interconnection, which is considered one of the four components of Internet Neutrality by Weitzer (2006) 40 Finally, there is a potential governance issue related to the pricing of interconnection by CrossRef, an issue that we did not address. More precisely, if large commercial publishers control CrossRef, they may try to exclude small publishers by charging high membership fees: Actually, World Summit On the Information Society (WSIS) expressed such a concern.
41 the four components of Internet Neutrality. Our clause of no discrimination among rivals is much weaker than his non-discriminatory peering, which is equivalent to mandatory full interconnection. 41 WSIS argues that CrossRef charges fees with discount for large volume users and thereby treat small publishers on an unequal basis. See http://www.wsis-si.org/DOI/index.html. Concerning the fees charged by CrossRef, see http://www.crossref.org/02publishers/20pub_fees.htm
We now prove that A cannot be equal to f1; 3g in a SPNE. Suppose by contradiction that a SPNE with A = f1; 3g exists. Then, in with only 1 and 3 active, these publishers play a NE in which the library buys B 1 &B 3 , at some prices (P 1 ; P 3 ). This implies that M > U 1 U 3 , because if M U 1 U 3 then 1 can induce the library to buy B 1 at the price P 1 = M , given that the library's payo¤ is U 1 M and this is higher than the payo¤ U 3 P 3 obtained by purchasing B 3 , for any P 3 > 0. Therefore, M > U 1 U 3 is necessary if 3 is to make a pro…t. Now suppose that 2 is active (and chooses x 2 = 1, respectively (x 21 ; x 23 ) = (1; 0) if we are considering m or b ). Then the SPNE needs to specify a NE of in which the library does not buy B 2 ; we prove below that no such NE exists. If the NE of is such that the library buys B 1 &B 3 and not B 2 , 44 then the equilibrium prices must be such that P 1 + P 3 = M . However, if publisher 2 chooses P 2 < P 3 , then from A1 we have u(12) = U 1 + U 2 + I 12 y 12 P 1 P 2 > u(13) = U 1 + U 3 + I 13 y 13 P 1 P 3 . We also have u (13) maxfu (1); u(3)g since the library was supposed to buy B 1 &B 3 . Therefore, the library will buy B 2 (and maybe also B 1 or B 3 ), which means that there exists no SPNE with A = f1; 3g.
Proof of Lemma 2
(i) Let (P 1 ; P 2 ; P 3 ) be the equilibrium prices; then we show that P 1 + P 2 + P 3 = M . If P 1 + P 2 + P 3 < M , then M < U I 12 implies that P i < U i for at least one i and then a pro…table deviation for i exists. Indeed, the library would be still willing to buy B 1 &B 2 &B 3 even if P i were larger than P i , provided that P i < U i and P i + P j + P j M . In order to determine the other conditions which must be satis…ed by (P 1 ; P 2 ; P 3 ), we notice that if 1 increases P 1 above P 1 , the library cannot buy anymore the three bundles. Thus, the deviation of 1 is pro…table if and only if the library buys B 1 , or B 1 &B 2 , or B 1 &B 3 . In other words, 1's deviation does not occur if and only if (4) below is satis…ed at prices (P 1 ; P 2 ; P 3 ); conditions (5)- (6) 
In what follows, we prove the following claim. Claim: (4)-(6) are equivalent to u(12) = u(13) = u(23).
44 If the NE is such that the library buys only B 1 , then the same arguments given when proving that M > U 1 U 3 show that the library will not buy only B 1 if M > U 1 U 2 , and this inequality is implied by M > U 1 U 3 .
Note that u(12) = u(13) = u(23) reduce to (1)- (2) . Therefore, proving the claim is enough to prove Lemma 2(i). We prove the claim by showing that in each L.H.S. or R.H.S. of (4)-(6), the maximum is obtained when the library buys two bundles.
We …rst observe that if the left hand side of (4) is zero, then u(12) 0, u(13) 0, u(23) 0 or, equivalently, P 1 + P 2 U 1 + U 2 + I 12 y 12 , P 1 + P 3 U 1 + U 3 + I 13 y 13 , P 2 + P 3 U 2 + U 3 + I 23 y 23 . These three inequalities imply M U , which contradicts M < U I 12 . Therefore, it is necessary that maxf0; u(2); u(3); u(23)g > 0 and we distinguish three cases, depending on the value of maxf0; u(2); u(3); u(23)g.
The case in which u(2) u(3) and u(2) > maxf0; u(23)g From u(2) > u(23) follows that P 3 > U 3 + I 23 y 23 and u(3) < 0. From (5) we see that either u(1) > 0 and u(1) u(13), or u(13) > maxf0; u(1)g. Suppose now that u(13) > maxf0; u(1)g. Since P 3 > U 3 , the inequality u(13) > u(1) requires y 13 = 1 and P 3 < U 3 +I 13 . We …nd that (4)-(6) boil down to u(2) = u(13) u(12), thus prices satisfy
(M + 2U 2 U I 13 ) and u(13) = u(2) = 1 2 (U + I 13 M ). Furthermore, u(12) = U 1 + U 2 + I 12 y 12 (M P 3 ) and thus u(2) u(12) reduces to M U 2U 3 + 2I 12 y 12 I 13 + 2P 3 . This right hand side is larger than U I 12 since P 3 > U 3 + I 23 y 23 ; then we get M > U I 12 , a contradiction.
The case in which u(3) > maxf0; u(2); u(23)g From u(3) > u(23) follows that P 2 > U 2 + I 23 y 23 and u(2) < 0. From (6) we infer that either u(1) > 0 and u(1) u(12), or u(12) > maxf0; u(1)g.
Suppose …rst that u(1) > 0 and u(1) u (12) . Then u(3) u(1) u(3) by (4) and (6) . Thus u(1) = u(3) > 0 and u(13) > u(1) = u(3), which violates (4).
Suppose now that u(12) > maxf0; u(1)g. Since P 2 > U 2 , the inequality u(12) > u(1) requires y 12 = 1 and P 2 < U 2 + I 12 . Then (4)-(6) boil down to u(3) = u(12) u(13) and thus prices satisfy
and then u(3) u(13) reduces to M U 2U 2 + 2I 13 y 13 I 12 + 2P 2 > U I 12 since P 2 > U 2 + I 23 y 23 : contradiction.
The case in which u(23) > 0 and u(23) maxfu(2); u(3)g Now (4)-(6) reduce to [notice that (7) is used to obtain (8)- (9)]:
u (23) maxfu (1); u(12); u(13)g
maxfu(1); u(3); u(13)g u(23)
maxfu (1); u(2); u(12)g u(23)
We want to prove that (7)- (9) are equivalent to u(12) = u(13) = u(23), thus we exclude all other cases. With reference to (8) , suppose that u(1) u(23). Then using (7) we …nd u(23) = u(1) maxfu (12); u(13)g and prices satisfy
The two equalities yield
and u (1) u(12) reduces to M U 2U 3 + 2I 12 y 12 I 23 y 23 + 2P 3 U I 12 since P 3 U 3 + I 13 y 23 : contradiction. This allows to delete u(1) from (7)- (9) . Now, still with reference to (8) , suppose that u(3) = u(23). Then P 2 = U 2 + I 23 y 23 and u(2) 0, u(3) = u(23) = u(12) u (13) . We can argue like in the case in which u(3) > maxf0; u(2); u(23)g (see above) to derive that M U I 12 from u(3) = u(12) u(13): contradiction. This implies that (7)-(8) reduce to u(13) = u(23) u (12) . Finally, with reference to (9) , suppose that u(2) = u(23). Then P 3 = U 3 + I 23 y 23 and u(2) = u (13) u (12); thus we can argue like in the case in which u(2) u(3) and u(2) > maxf0; u(23)g (see above) to derive that M U I 12 from u(2) = u(13) u(12): contradiction.
Thus, we have found that (7)-(9) are equivalent to u(12) = u(13) = u(23) which reduce to (1)-(2); using P 1 +P 2 +P 3 = M we obtain P 1 = P 1 (y), P 2 = P 2 (y), P 3 = P 3 (y). Notice that P 1 (y) > P 2 (y) > P 3 (y) for any y (given A1), and P 3 (y) > 0 if and only if M > M (y). Furthermore, the conditions u(23) maxfu(2); u(3)g and u(13) u(1) are equivalent, respectively, to U + 2I 12 y 12 I 13 y 13 + 2I 23 y 23 M , U I 12 y 12 + 2I 13 y 13 + 2I 23 y 23 M and U + 2I 12 y 12 + 2I 13 y 13 I 23 y 23 M and are satis…ed for any M between M (y) and U I 12 .
(ii) Given any M U 1 + U 2 , the equilibrium prices satisfy P 1 + P 2 = M , otherwise P i < U i for at least one i and then i can pro…tably increase P i slightly above P i (we are arguing here as in the beginning of the proof of Lemma 2(i)). Given P 2 , if 1 chooses P 1 > P 1 then the library cannot a¤ord to buy B 1 &B 2 : It will buy B 1 if and only if U 1 P 1 > U 2 P 2 , and this condition is violated for any P 1 > P 1 if and only if U 1 P 1 U 2 P 2 . Likewise, 2 has no incentive to deviate if and only if U 1 P 1 U 2 P 2 . Then we …nd P 1 =P 1 , P 2 =P 1 andP 1 >P 2 ; furthermore,P 2 > 0 if and only if M > U 1 U 2 .
Proof of Proposition 1
Recall that, in 0 , y 12 = y 13 = y 23 = 0.
(i) When M U 1 U 2 and A = f1; 2g or A = f1; 2; 3g, Lemma 2 states that there exists no NE of such that the library buys B 1 &B 2 or B 1 &B 2 &B 3 . Thus, by Lemma 1, the only SPNE of 0 is such that A = f1g and P 1 = M .
(ii) When U 1 U 2 < M M (0; 0; 0) and A = f1; 2; 3g, Lemma 2(i) states that there exists no NE of such that the library buys B 1 &B 2 &B 3 . Thus, by Lemma 1, A = f1g or A = f1; 2g. However, A cannot be f1g because if also 2 is active, then has a unique NE and it is such that the library buys B 1 &B 2 (see Lemma 2(ii)); 2's pro…t is thenP 2 > 0. Hence 2 will be active, i.e. A = f1; 2g, and (P 1 ; P 2 ) = (P 1 ;P 2 ) by Lemma 2(ii). (iii) When M (0; 0; 0) < M U I 12 and A = f1; 2; 3g. Lemma 2(i) states that each publisher succeeds in selling his bundle. Hence, A = f1; 2; 3g and P i = P i (0; 0; 0).
Proof of Lemma 3
(i) The same proof given for Proposition 1(i) applies.
(ii)-(iii) If M > U 1 U 2 , we can argue as in the proof of Proposition 1(ii) to rule out that A = f1g. Then we apply backward induction to …nd out when A = f1; 2g occurs and when A = f1; 2; 3g occurs.
Stage three Given (x 1 ; x 2 ), publisher 3 stays out if M M (y 12 ; x 1 ; x 2 ) because then in there is no NE in which he makes a positive pro…t, regardless of x 3 . Conversely, if M > M (y 12 ; x 1 ; x 2 ), then 3 is active and joins CrossRef because by doing so he makes a pro…t equal to 1 3 [M M (y 12 ; x 1 ; x 2 )] > 0 -actually, if x 1 = x 2 = 0 and M > M (0; 0; 0), then 3 is indi¤erent between x 3 = 0 and x 3 = 1.
Stage two Publisher 2 chooses x 2 as a function of x 1 , by taking into account the future behavior of 3 as described above. The case of x 1 = 0. When M < M (001), 2 is indi¤erent between x 2 = 0 and x 2 = 1 because in any case 3 will stay out and 2's pro…t will beP 2 . When instead M (0; 0; 1) < M M (0; 0; 0), 3 is active if and only if x 2 = 1 and then 2 chooses x 2 = 1 because this will yield him P 2 (0; 0; 1), which is larger than his pro…tP 2 if x 2 = 0. Finally, when M > M (0; 0; 0), 3 is active for any x 2 and thus 2 will interconnect because P 2 (0; 0; 1) > P 2 (0; 0; 0).
The case of x 1 = 1. When M < M (0; 1; 0), 2 is indi¤erent between x 2 = 0 and x 2 = 1 because 3 will not be active in any case. If M > M (1; 1; 1), then 3 is active for any x 2 and therefore 2 interconnects. When M (0; 1; 0) < M M (1; 1; 1), 3 is active if and only if x 2 = 0; then 2 chooses x 2 = 1 to exclude 3 becauseP 2 > P 2 (0; 1; 0).
Stage one Publisher 1 is indi¤erent between x 1 = 0 and x 1 = 1 when M M (0; 1; 0) because in any case 3 will not be active. When M (0; 1; 0) < M < M (0; 0; 1), 3 is active if and only if x 1 = 1 and x 2 = 0, but we know that 2 will instead choose x 2 = 1. When M > M (0; 0; 1), 3 is active (and interconnected) if and only if M > M (x 1 ; x 1 ; 1). Thus, for M between M (0; 0; 1) and M (1; 1; 1), 1 can exclude 3 by playing x 1 = 1 and obtainP 1 , while his pro…t with x 1 = 0 is P 1 (0; 0; 1). SinceP 1 > P 1 (0; 0; 1) holds, 1 will interconnect for these values of M . Furthermore, 1 will join CrossRef also for M > M (1; 1; 1) because P 1 (y) is increasing in (y 12 ; y 13 ).
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is straightforward from lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 3
(i) The same proof given for proposition 1(i) applies. (iii) We show that no SPNE of ms is such that A = f1; 2; 3g and (x i ; x j ; x k ) = (1; 0; 0) or (x i ; x j ; x k ) = (1; 1; 0). In other terms, in any SPNE with A = f1; 2; 3g and x 1 +x 2 +x 3 1 we …nd x 1 = x 2 = x 3 = 1. By lemma 2(i), this requires that M > M (1; 1; 1) and prices are P 1 (1; 1; 1); P 2 (1; 1; 1); P 3 (1; 1; 1). No SPNE of ms is such that A = f1; 2; 3g and (x i ; x j ; x k ) = (1; 0; 0). When (x i ; x j ; x k ) = (1; 0; 0), we prove that publisher j and/or publisher k has an incentive to interconnect. With (x i ; x j ; x k ) = (1; 0; 0), the equilibrium prices of are P 1 (0; 0; 0), P 2 (0; 0; 0), P 3 (0; 0; 0) by lemma 2(i) and it is necessary that M > M (0; 0; 0) in order for P 3 (0; 0; 0) to be positive. In the case that i = 3, then it is pro…table for 1 to set x 1 = 1 because M > M (0; 0; 0) implies M > M (0; 1; 0), thus the equilibrium prices will be P 1 (0; 1; 0), P 2 (0; 1; 0), P 3 (0; 1; 0) and P 1 (0; 1; 0) > P 1 (0; 0; 0). Likewise, if i = 2 then it is pro…table for 3 to set x 3 = 3 because the equilibrium prices will be P 1 (0; 0; 1), P 2 (0; 0; 1), P 3 (0; 0; 1) and P 3 (0; 0; 1) > P 3 (0; 0; 0). The same argument applies if i = 1.
In the case of (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (0; 1) it is clear that the value of x 21 does not matter. Furthermore, M (0; 1; x 23 ) M (0; 1; 0) and thus 3 will be active for any x 23 ; 2's best action is then (x 21 ; x 23 ) = (0; 1). In the case of (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (1; 0) or (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (0; 0), we do not actually need to …nd the optimal (x 21 ; x 23 ) for 2: (i) if (x 21 ; x 23 ) excludes 3, then 1 can achieve the same outcome by playing (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (1; 1). If (x 21 ; x 23 ) is such that 3 is active, then y 12 is necessarily equal to 0 and thus 1's pro…t is P 1 (0; 0; 1), smaller than the pro…t P 1 (0; 1; 1) he earns by playing (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (0; 1).
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) (ii), (v) are obvious from Lemma 4 and the main texts in section 4.
(iii) The arguments in the proof of lemma 4 imply that 1 needs to compare (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (1; 1) -which makes 3 inactive -with (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (0; 1) -which makes 3 active and yields 1 the pro…t P 1 (0; 1; 1). Therefore we verify that for any M 2 ( M (0; 1; 0); M (1; 1; 0)], the inequality b P 2I 12 : Publisher 3 is not active if and only if y 12 = 1 and y 13 = 0. This requires that 1 plays (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (1; 0), and then 2 can exclude 3 by playing (x 21 ; x 23 ) = (1; 0) (earning b P 2 ) otherwise his best option is to induce 3 to be active by playing (x 21 ; x 23 ) = (0; 1), which gives him P 2 (0; 0; 1). Since b P 2 P 2 (0; 0; 1) is equivalent to M U 3U 3 + 2I 23 , we conclude that b P 2 P 2 (0; 0; 1) for any M between M (1; 1; 0) and M (1; 0; 1), given that 3I 23 2I 12 . Therefore, it is optimal for 1 to play x 12 ; x 13 ) = (1; 1). Then, publisher 2 cannot exclude 3 by playing (x 21 ; x 23 ) = (1; 0) as M > M (1; 1; 0).and hence chooses (x 21 ; x 23 ) = (1; 1), implying that all publishers are active and fully interconnected. When 2I 12 I 13 + 2I 23 and that 4I 23 3I 13 : In this case, if 1 plays (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (1; 0), 2 …nds it optimal to exclude 3 by playing (x 21 ; x 23 ) = (1; 0) since b P 2 > P 2 (0; 0; 1). If 1 plays (x 12 ; x 13 ) = (1; 1), as we have already seen, 2 is unable to exclude 3 and therefore all three are active and fully interconnected. Finally, 1 prefers to exclude 3 since P 1 (1; 1; 1) < b P 1 is equivalent to M > U 3U 3 +2(I 12 +I 13 2I 23 ) and M (1; 1; 0) U 3U 3 +2(I 12 +I 13 2I 23 ) holds from 4I 23 3I 13 .
Proof of Lemma 5
The proof of (i)-(ii) is given in the text immediately after the statement of the lemma. (iii) We start by noticing that if x 2 = 1, then 3 can maximize his interconnections with x 3 = 1, which induces y = (1; 1; 1). Hence, x 2 = 1 implies that duopoly occurs if M M (1; 1; 1), while 3 will be active (with full interconnection) if M > M (1; 1; 1). If instead x 2 = 0, then 3 will choose x 32 = 1 if and only if x 23 = 1, and given x 1 = 1 and x 12 = 0, we simply need to evaluate the alternatives of x 23 = 0 and x 23 = 1 for …rm 2. In the …rst case, 2 earnsP 2 for M M (0; 1; 0) and P 2 (0; 1; 0) for M > M (0; 1; 0); in the second case he earnsP 2 for M M (0; 1; 1) and P 2 (0; 1; 1) for M > M (0; 1; 1). Sincê P 2 > P 2 (0; 1; 1) > P 2 (0; 1; 0) for any M > M (0; 1; 1), we conclude that 2 prefers x 2 = 1, and thus the same outcome as in m results. 
Proof of Proposition 6
Propositoin 6 is a direct consequence of lemma 5 and the proof is omitted. 46 b P 2 > P 2 (0; 1; 1) if and only if M > U 3U 3 + 2I 23 4I 13 , and U 3U 3 + 2I 23 4I 13 is smaller than M (0; 1; 1). Thus b P 2 > P 2 (0; 1; 1) holds for any M > M (0; 1; 1).
